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the politicAl context And iSSUeS
Since 2006, Nepal has been undergoing a political 
transition that could herald major changes in the society. 
Some major political transformations have already taken 
place (discussed below) while other change agendas are 
being hotly debated. Two important contested issues are 
the extent of socio-political inclusion of diverse ethnic 
groups (ethnic/national, caste, religious, linguistic, and 
regional identity) and forms of democratic structures for 
the “new” Nepal.  These contested issues are important for 
two reasons.  First, they will affect a majority of Nepalis. 
Second, the country failed in both fronts in the past.  The 
majority of its diverse citizens were excluded from various 
realms of social and political action for most of Nepal’s 
two and half centuries of existence while attempts at 
democratization since the fifties failed multiple times.  
Being the oldest state in South Asia has not advantaged 
Nepal in its democratic trajectory or in the accommodation 
of its diverse ethnic groups.    In fact, both exclusion 
and inequalities among ethnic groups and the failure of 
democratization, two issues analyzed in this volume of 
Himalaya, are the result of the Nepali state’s long history 
of authoritarianism.  Although people’s rights were slowly 
being expanded in early democracies during this period 
and even though the British Raj introduced local elections 
and some level of representative government to its South 
Asian colonies during the first half of twentieth century, 
Nepal’s rulers were strengthening their authoritarian 
regime even until the mid-twentieth century.  Among other 
things, inequality and exclusion, which are not favorable 
for fostering democracy and could become inimical to it 
as well, became entrenched during this long period of 
authoritarian rule.  The CHHEM (caste hill Hindu elite 
males) consolidated their hold with the consolidation 
of the state, and inequality as well as exclusion of many 
ethnic, caste, religious, and linguistic groups began, 
continued or became consolidated during this period.  The 
inequalities and exclusionary norms and practices became 
so entrenched that they largely continued even during the 
short democratic interludes of the 1950s and 1990s.  The 
relatively open polity, however, energized activists of the 
traditionally excluded groups to organize against their 
marginalization and demand equal rights.  The challenges 
especially increased during the democratic years of 1990-
2002 due to the considerable political rights to organize 
and mobilize guaranteed in the 1990 Constitution.  After 
the ‘surprising’ rise of identity politics during the nineties, 
exclusion began to receive increasing academic and political 
attention.  Considerable work has been carried out on this 
issue but many aspects of exclusion are yet to be analyzed, 
as the contributions of this volume make clear.  The articles 
in this volume will contribute to illuminate additional 
dimensions of exclusion and inequality, including after the 
multiple transitions to democracy.  
diScoUrSe on exclUSion And 
ineQUAlity: pASt And preSent
Nepal’s attempt at development, which began after 
the 1951 transition to democracy, largely focused on 
class inequality for most of the time.  Development was 
seen as reducing poverty through modernization by 
targeting individual citizens.  However, these policies 
exacerbated inequality among various groups (Bista 1991). 
The dominant group largely benefitted from the policies 
because even though couched in universal discourse, the 
policies and institutions were influenced by their values, 
worldviews and interests (Lawoti 2005).  For example, 
recruitment to the civil service through exams conducted 
in the native language of the dominant group resulted 
in their overwhelming domination of the bureaucracy. 
The state promoted nationalism, which was based on hill 
Hindu religious values, the Nepali language aka Khas-kura 
of the dominant group, hill dress and the Hindu monarchy, 
projected the ethos and worldviews of the dominant group as 
universal while considering others as deviant.  
Writing and discussing ethnic issues from a political 
angle was considered taboo and discouraged even during 
the late nineties (Hangen 2000; Kraemer 2003).1  Such an 
environment restricted academic research on the issues of 
exclusion and inequalities among different ethnic groups. 
Anthropologists and social scientists produced a corpus 
of knowledge on many ethnic groups that has contributed 
to understanding the status, including unequal positions, 
of those groups, but the studies rarely framed themselves 
explicitly from the exclusion and inequality angle, largely 
due to the unfriendly and constraining circumstances.  This 
does not mean that occasional academic work, even that 
produced during the Panchayat regime, had not pointed out 
exclusion (for instance, Gaige 1975; Beenhakker 1973; Rana 
1971; Caplan 1970; Holmberg 1989), but exclusion had not 
become a major theme of political or academic discourse 
before 1990.    
The exclusionary nationalism promoted by the state 
began to be challenged after the polity opened up in 1990. 
Political parties like the Nepal Sadbhawana Party (Nepal 
Goodwill Party), Rastriya Janamukti Party (National Peoples’ 
Liberation Party), Mongol National Organization and 
associations of ethnic groups and NGOs of Dalits pointed 
out the exclusion of the Dalit, indigenous nationalities, and 
Madhesi from various socio-economic, cultural and political 
realms and they argued that the previous development and 
modernization policies had neglected or even discriminated 
against them (Lawoti 2005; Hangen 2010).  This new form of 
nationalism that emerged from the society, and is empowering 
the traditionally marginalized group, sharply contrasts and, 
in fact, challenges the state led and imposed exclusionary 
nationalism that had privileged the CHHE as the cost of Dalit, 
indigenous nationalities, Madhesi and minority religious 
groups like the Muslims.   
Initial attention on exclusion pivoted around cultural 
discrimination and on the under- or non-representation of 
1. This situation has changed considerably, and as a result much more 
work on these issues have been conducted.  However, many members of 
CHHE academia and media still project the social justice movements of the 
ethnic groups as divisive (for examples of such opinions in recent years, 
see Himal Khabarpatrika, which occasionally provides space for the “other” 
perspectives and loves to project itself as a “professional” newsmagazine. See 
International Crisis Group (2009) for a discussion of “mainstream” media 
bias against the Maoists after the 2008 Constituent Assembly election.  I 
have been asked by some Bahun friends whether particular anthropologists 
working on ethnic groups are Bahun birodhi (anti-Bahun).  Historic context 
is provided by Holmberg (2006), who has written that he was removed “for 
his own safety” from a Tamang village he was studying in 1977 after being 
implicated, with no fault of his or his host, in local symbolic ethnic politics.   
various groups in the governance of the country.  Various 
works pointed out that indigenous nationalities and Madhesi 
were facing linguistic, religious, citizenship and other 
forms of cultural discrimination, while Dalit were facing 
caste-based discrimination and women were socially and 
legally discriminated against (Bhattachan 1995; Gurung 
et al. 2000; Jha 1993; Kisan 2005; FWLD 2000).  Data on 
representation of different groups in various influential state 
and society sectors showed the overwhelming domination of 
the CHHEM (Neupane 2000).  The discussion of exclusion 
from governance assumes that descriptive or bodily 
representation is necessary for protecting the interests of 
different groups.  Other work pointed out material inequality 
among ethnic groups as well, such as in access to education 
and employment opportunities (NESAC 1998; World Bank 
and DFID 2006).  
Once exclusion among different groups even under 
democracy was established and accepted to some extent in 
the mainstream political and social discourse by late nineties, 
work began to identify causes of exclusion.  Many work 
pointed out that formal institutions were the causes behind 
the exclusions. Constitutional articles that discriminated 
against native languages, minority religions, ethnic, caste 
and identity groups, the first past the post electoral system, 
and the unitary state etc. were pointed out as contributing 
to exclusion (for example, see Bhattachan 2000; Khanal 
2004; Lawoti 2005, 2007; Neupane 2000; FWLD 2000). 
The ongoing political transformation is aimed at replacing 
many of these formal exclusionary political institutions.  The 
papers in this volume of Himalaya, however, suggest that 
formal political institutional reforms may not be enough to 
ensure inclusion because exclusion in entrenched deeply 
beyond the formal political arena.  
contentS oF thiS volUme
The first three papers in this volume increase 
understanding of exclusion and inter-group inequality 
by analyzing newer dimensions of these phenomena, 
including their causes and consequences, while the fourth 
paper provides the political context in which exclusion has 
continued, with a discussion of the multiple democratic 
transitions Nepal has gone through.  
Lawoti’s article points out that informal institutions by 
themselves as well as in interaction with formal institutions, 
contributed to exclusion by constraining, or creating 
incentives, for political actors to behave in certain ways. 
The article points out the role of the religiously supported 
patriarchy on the exclusion of women, the role of the 
Hindu caste system and the marginalization of Dalit and 
other ‘lower’ castes like the indigenous nationalities, and it 
discusses the role of hill nationalism in the exclusion of the 
Madhesi.  The informal institutions competed, substituted 
or complemented formal institutions to often exclude the 
marginalized groups (occasionally they promoted inclusion 
as well).  This suggests that exclusion may continue even if 
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new formal non-exclusionary institutions are established or 
new laws ban certain informal exclusionary practices because 
cultural attitudes die hard.  The classic example is the practice 
of untouchability even after the 1990 Constitution declared 
it illegal.  Thus, the ongoing reforms on the formal political 
sector that target formal exclusionary institutions of the past 
may not be adequate to reduce or eliminate various forms of 
exclusion in “new” Nepal.  Exclusionary informal institutions 
have to be targeted by new formal institutions to reduce or 
eliminate them. 
Tiwari presents four categories of inequality employing 
the horizontal inequality concept.  His paper contributes to 
the discussion of exclusion in at least two ways.  First, even 
though the concept of horizontal inequality in the Nepali 
context was introduced as a spatial-horizontal concept earlier 
(Murshed and Gates 2005), Tiwari uses it with regard to ethnic 
groups more specifically.  The concept will help to clarify the 
frequent confusion between class/vertical inequalities with 
inequality among groups.  Critics of ethnic social justice 
movements often argue that poor Bahuns also face oppressive 
conditions.  However, a poor Bahun does not suffer from 
an additional oppression of untouchability that a poor Dalit 
does, or the ethnic prejudice a poor member of a marginalized 
ethnic group endures.  Furthermore, untouchability and 
ethnic prejudice have additional consequences for those 
who must endure them.2  Second, Tiwari presents four 
categories, namely inequality in cultural, political, economic 
and social outcomes.  This is more comprehensive than 
earlier categorizations that pointed out, often separately but 
occasionally together as well, exclusion in cultural, political 
and policy realms (NC-IP-Nepal 1993; Bhattachan 1997; 
Neupane 2000; Lawoti 2002, 2005). Tiwari provides data to 
show that ethnic groups also face inequalities in economic 
and social outcomes.3   
Shakya does not directly look at exclusion or inequality 
but her article contributes to understanding how control of the 
state has consequences for ethnic inequality in the economy, 
which is often considered outside the realm of culture, by 
showing the historic and contemporary role of the state in the 
business sector.  She argues that ethnicity played a vital role 
in advantaging members of the ruling group and their allies 
and disadvantaging members of non-ruling groups.  Members 
2. Compared to ethnic groups, the concept of horizontal inequality 
may not capture the overwhelming inequality faced by Dalits, who are 
vertically subordinated to the “high” caste groups (Horowitz 1985: 21-
36).  The horizontal inequality concept assumes that groups are different 
and separate horizontally.  However, if the notion of horizontal inequality 
is employed simultaneously with vertical inequality, the combined use of 
the two concepts may capture more fully the situation of the Dalits, who 
comprise a separate but subordinated group.
3. I have elsewhere identified exclusion in eight spheres (exclusion in 
citizenship/participation; governance; policy; cultural; symbols; civil society; 
knowledge generation and dissemination; and economy) (Lawoti 2010, 
unpublished monograph).
of the ruling ethnic group benefitted with assignments in 
the lucrative sectors and from contracts and deals due to 
its connection with the state.  Other non-ruling groups like 
the Newar were also engaged in the business sector but they 
rarely benefitted from state patronage.  In fact, they have 
suffered due to state negligence and discriminatory policies, 
such as the requirement, following Hindu traditions, to 
purify after foreign travel.4  Shakya points out that the biases 
continued even after liberal market reforms were introduced 
and implemented in the mid eighties and nineties.  
Kantha’s article, on the other hand, does not discuss 
ethnicity or exclusion and inequalities but nevertheless 
has relevance for these topics.  Employing concepts and 
ideas from the vast democratic transition literature, Kantha 
points out that three transitions to democracy have already 
failed in Nepal. If a large number of people belonging to 
marginalized groups are excluded even during democracy, 
the democratic polity may not be perceived as legitimate by 
those who are excluded.  In such circumstances, first, the 
democratic polity may be weak due to the lack of popular 
support.  Second, the anti-democratic forces may cultivate 
the excluded and dissatisfied groups, as seen during King 
Mahendra’s cooptation of indigenous and Madhesi leaders 
after the 1960 royal coup and after the dismissal of the elected 
government in 2002 by the then King Gyanendra (Lawoti 
2008), in addition to the mobilization of excluded groups. 
The multiple failures of previous democratic transitions 
suggest that if various forms of exclusion are not addressed 
during the ongoing transition, then exclusion may hinder 
consolidation of democracy this time also.
inclUSive reFormS Since the 2006 regime 
chAnge 
The regime transition of 2006 has brought major political 
transformations, and unlike the previous transitions has 
made some significant impact on exclusion/inclusion as well. 
The state was declared secular in 2006 while the Hindu 
Kingship was eliminated in 2008.  Citizenship certificates 
were distributed in 2007 to more than two million Nepalis 
who were denied them earlier, mostly Madhesi but others 
as well.  The Madhesi movement of 2007 also forced the 
ruling coalition partners to amend the Interim Constitution 
to declare that the country would adopt a federal structure 
in place of the unitary system.  The reservation policy begun 
in 2003 by the royal regime was expanded after 2006 to 
include the Madhesi as well.  The election to the Constituent 
Assembly in 2008 was conducted with a mixed proportional 
electoral method that helped to elect many members of the 
marginalized groups. Even though public holidays are still 
overwhelmingly on CHHE festivals, many holidays have 
4. Janga Bahadur Rana also went through the purification ritual after 
his return from Europe but for him it was a one-time affair and the practice 
legitimized his rule. For Newar traders prior to modern times it was a 
repeated and costly affair.
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In this context, what led to the current inclusive reforms? 
Literature point out that democratic process, insurgency 
and rebellions, regime change, and social movements could 
facilitate reforms.  Which political process or events facilitated 
them in 2006 (and not during earlier transitions)?  
The democratization literature mentions that the opening 
up of the polity could lead to further reforms.  Introduction of 
mass electoral politics empowers voters, and citizens could vote 
for their choice, forcing democratic leaders to respond if they 
want to perform well in future elections (Dahl 1971; O’Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986).  According to this logic, the demands 
and pressure upon the democratic political actors would force 
the state to respond and introduce reforms.  However, this 
did not happen in Nepal with regard to inclusive reforms 
during the past democratic epochs.  Major reforms to address 
demands for federalism, the proportional electoral system, a 
secular state, the three language policy, reservations in public 
offices and admission to education institutions, citizenship 
certificates to those without them, and an end to substantial 
cultural and caste discrimination were not initiated during 
the 1990-2002 democratic years.8  Only minor reforms, 
such as issuance of a few stamps commemorating heroes of 
the marginalized groups, establishment of powerless and 
financially strapped Dalit and Women commissions and the 
foundation for the indigenous nationalities, were carried out. 
The Nepali experience suggests that a democratic regime 
may be more responsive than an autocratic one, but it may 
only introduce minor reforms.  This supports the thesis that 
policy changes in democracies usually occur incrementally 
if there are no major crises (Truman 1951; Lindblom 1959). 
Major reforms were obstructed in Nepal because the state 
was overwhelmingly dominated by the dominant group and 
the democratic rule of the game was set up based on the 
majoritarian principle where most of the state power was 
enjoyed by the party/group in power.9 
Since major reforms did not occur during the democratic 
years, the Nepali case suggests that democracy by itself may 
not lead to major inclusive reforms.  The question then is 
what or which event or process caused the major inclusive 
8. The demand for the three language policy, which was made by 
native language groups, calls for teaching an international language, a 
countrywide medium language, and a local/regional language in schools.  
Citizenship certificates were not awarded to many Madhesi and others, 
including children of women married to foreigners. Cultural discrimination 
included absence of public holidays on non-CHHE festivals, absence of non-
CHHE heroes and imposition of CHHE values on others.  
9. In fact, majoritarian democratic institutions could facilitate 
discrimination and exclusion of minorities because the government may 
respond to the narrow preferences of the majority group, as seen in Sri 
Lanka (Tambiah 1986; DeVotta 2004).  A consensus system, which is an 
opposite democratic model, shares powers among different actors, including 
opposition and minorities, and different level of governments.  It is more 
often found in ethnically divided established democracies (Lijphart 1977, 
1999). 
been declared for indigenous nationalities, Christian and 
Muslim festivals.  Likewise a few indigenous nationalities 
have been added to the rooster of the mostly CHHE national 
heroes declared by the state.5 
The progress in terms of representation in various state 
organs, however, is mixed.  The Constituent Assembly has 
become the most representative legislature ever in Nepali 
history.  However, the Dalit are still underrepresented despite 
significant progress.  The cabinet is less representative than the 
Constituent Assembly.  The Madhesi and Dalit have increased 
their representation in the cabinet but representation of 
the indigenous nationalities has declined.6  The judiciary 
and bureaucracy are still highly unrepresentative where 
the domination of CHHE is still disproportionately high 
(Lawoti forthcoming).7  The ceremonial president and vice 
president are Madhesi and the Constituent Assembly chair is 
an indigenous nationality but the powerful executive is still 
headed by a male Bahun.  All the major parties are still led by 
CHHEM.  Despite these shortcomings on the representational 
sector and with other issues like ethnic autonomy and equal 
recognition of native languages not yet decided, on balance 
the 2006 transition has brought the most inclusive reform in 
Nepal’s history.  
tentAtive thoUghtS on FActorS 
contribUting to reForm 
Transitions, by definition, bring changes and the 1951, 
1979-80, 1990 and 2006 transitions that Kantha discusses 
were changes towards democracy.  However, as pointed out 
before, the earlier transitions did not herald major inclusive 
reforms.  In fact, as Lawoti and Tiwari point out, exclusion 
continued even during the 1990-2002 democratic years. 
5. In 2066 v. s. (2009-10), 10 percent and 1.43 percent public 
holidays were declared for the festivals of non-Newar Hill and Tarai 
indigenous nationalities. respectively.  The proportion of holidays on CHHE 
festivals had declined as a result but still stood at 54.29 percent.  In 2057 v. 
s. (2000-01), 68.85 percent of public holidays were on CHHE festivals while 
holidays for non-Newar indigenous nationalities, Muslims, and Christian 
festivals were nil (Lawoti forthcoming).  
6. The non-Dalit Madhesi caste groups’ representation reached 18.5 
percent and that of Dalit 7.5 percent during the 2006-2009 period while the 
representation of non-Newar indigenous nationalities declined to 16 percent. 
The average representation of indigenous nationalities was 16.1, 16.7 
and 27.1 percent during 2002-2006, 1990-2002 and 1976-1990 periods 
respectively (Lawoti, forthcoming).
7. The Dalit, non-Newar indigenous nationalities, and Madhesi were 
underrepresented at 0, 5.63 and 11.27 percent respectively in the judiciary 
during the 2006-2009 years while the CHHE dominated with 64.82 percent. 
The CHHE domination in bureaucracy (special class and equivalent) was 
83.93 percent in 2009 while Dalit, non-Newar indigenous nationalities, 
and Madhesi had representation of 0, 0 and 8.93 percent respectively (Tarai 
indigenous nationalities are included in the Madhesi category in this count 
of bureaucracy to make it comparable with the 1999 data where Neupane 
had lumped them in the Madhesi category).
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transformations in Nepal after 2006?  The social movement 
literature argues that if people mobilize, such collective actions 
could pressure governments to introduce reforms (McAdam, 
McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998).  This argument 
is supported by transitions towards democracy (1951, 
1979-80, 1990, and 2006) that Kantha discusses because 
those transitions occurred due to popular mobilizations 
that demanded democratic reforms.  However, the social 
movements of the excluded groups in the nineties were not 
able to get major inclusive concessions.  One explanation 
for the failure of the social justice movements is that the 
movements, despite exploding in the 1990s, were relatively 
new and they may not have developed enough organizational 
and mobilizational strengths (Lawoti 2005).  Whatever 
the reasons, it is clear that the social justice movements of 
the excluded groups were not able to bring major inclusive 
changes, which were introduced only after the 2006 regime 
change.  
Once the regime change occurred in 2006, however, the 
Madhesi utilized the fluid opportunity to launch a successful 
movement in 2007 that forced the government to accept 
federalism.  It also significantly contributed in making 
the government accept the mixed electoral method for the 
Constituent Assembly election.  Here it should be noted 
that the Madhesi movement became successful only after 
the 2006 regime change.  Scholars have pointed out that 
transition period could witness mobilization for changes 
because the old institutions are dismantled or discredited but 
new institutions are not set and the fluid situation generates 
incentives for change seeking agents to mobilize and push 
for changes as they rightly perceive that changes are more 
possible during transitions (Gurr 2000; Jarstad and Sisk 
2008).  A combination of fluid situation due to the ongoing 
transition and particularly the Madhesi movement that 
became successful because of it at that particular juncture, 
contributed in heralding a few major inclusive reforms but 
other major reforms had already taken place.  This brief 
discussion shows that social movements by themselves did 
not bring about the major inclusive changes in the country 
before the 2006 transition.
The Maoists, an insurgency as well as a social movement, 
are often credited with pushing for major transformations, 
including in ethnic relations, and putting them on the 
country’s socio-political agenda, as Shakya points out in her 
piece in this issue.  The Maoists contributed in highlighting 
the issue of exclusion much more than any other major 
political force.  They also politicized the rural periphery 
with their organization and rebellion related activities 
(recruitment, expansion, publicity campaign, control and 
governance etc.) (see Mottin 2009; Eck 2009; Joshi 2009). 
The Maoist implemented social reforms by penalizing sex, 
caste and ethnic prejudices and crimes in rural areas under 
their control (Lecomte-Tilouine 2009), declaring autonomous 
ethnic regions, and including more indigenous and Dalit 
leaders in their party and front organizations (Lawoti 2009). 
They created considerable pressure for inclusive changes and 
it might have contributed to the eventual reforms, but their 
pressure alone was not sufficient to force the government 
to introduce major inclusive reforms in the state during the 
insurgency period.10    
As pointed out before, the major inclusive reforms only 
came after the 2006 transition.  The 2006 regime change 
and subsequent inclusive reforms points out a few things 
if analyzed from a historical perspective.  First, regime 
change from autocracy can facilitate inclusive reforms but 
as demonstrated by the 1990 and earlier transitions, regime 
change is not sufficient to bring about inclusive reforms. 
Except for cooptation of a few minority individuals and minor 
reforms, substantial inclusive reforms did not occur during 
the earlier democratic transitions.  The question then is how 
was the 2006 transition different from earlier ones?  The forces 
that were demanding or committed to inclusive reforms (the 
Maoists, ethnic organizations and ethnic parties) were a 
part of the coalition that forced the royal regime to buckle 
down in 2006 while powerful inclusion seeking forces were 
absent in earlier democratic transitions.  The regime change 
was possible with the joint mobilization of the civil society 
(including ethnic organizations), parliamentary political 
parties (including ethnic parties),11 and the Maoists.12 
10. The argument is not that the government and the parliamentary 
parties did not feel the pressure but that the pressure was not sufficient 
to force the government into introducing major inclusive reforms.  The 
only major reform during the insurgency was reservations for Dalit and 
indigenous nationalities in the public sector and admissions to educational 
institutions in 2003, introduced during the Royal regime.  This partly 
supports the thesis that competition among political forces could lead 
to reforms but in this instance the competition did not occur among 
democratic parliamentary parties but between the parliamentary parties and 
the non-democratic monarchy. 
11. The parliamentary political parties had reluctantly adopted 
some of the demands for inclusion during the mobilization against the 
royal takeover to attract the excluded groups and to arrest the increasing 
influence of the Maoists among the excluded groups.  Ethnic organizations 
like the NEFIN (Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities) and 
its constituent organizations, and ethnic political parties like Nepal 
Sadhbhawana Party (Nepal Goodwill Party) faction that participated in 
the movement lobbied, advocated and pressured the larger parliamentary 
parties to adopt inclusive agendas, while ethnic members of the different 
political parties pressured their respective organizations to adopt inclusive 
agendas. Through the work of the identity movements since 1990, the 
larger society and parliamentary parties had also become more aware of the 
grievances of the excluded groups.
12. Ironically, it was the Royal intervention against the democratic 
regime that brought together these diverse forces, which were often at 
odds before 2005.  The dismissal of the elected government in 2002 took 
power away from the parliamentary political parties and pushed them to 
the streets against the monarchy.    A second aspect of the irony is that 
the Maoists, an anti democratic force that initially launched their rebellion 
against the parliamentary democratic polity in 1996, were possibly the 
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rights and civil liberties.  They expanded and grew partly 
because the democratic regime tolerated their early political 
activities such as street protests, expansion of organization, 
and preparation for the insurgency.  Unlike in 1971 when the 
authoritarian regime brutally repressed an armed uprising 
by the extreme left in East Nepal, the cost of repression 
increased for the democratic regime due to its pluralistic 
and tolerant politics.  Likewise many Maoist cadres were set 
free by the court through habeas corpus rights guaranteed 
by a democratic polity.  The free media, which became more 
professional and which expanded in the nineties, also gave 
considerable coverage to the Maoists agendas, issues and 
activities (Mishra 2004). 
The above discussion makes clear that even though 
social justice movements of the marginalized groups, the 
Maoists, the democratic parliamentary forces, and even 
regime transition per se did not bring about the inclusive 
reforms by themselves, their collective efforts at a particular 
juncture contributed to the endeavor.  However, the more 
important and final factor contributing to inclusive reforms 
was the decade long democratic regime of 1990-2002.  The 
democratic years provided enabling conditions for inclusive 
reform seeking forces to grow and sensitized the larger 
society and parliamentary political parties to the demands of 
the excluded groups so that they agreed to changes forcefully 
proposed by the social forces seeking a more inclusive polity 
during the 2006 transition process. 
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Even though the ethnic organizations and movements and 
the Maoists themselves were not able to bring about major 
inclusive reforms, they played a significant role in the struggle 
for regime change, and during the transition that heralded 
inclusive reforms.  The inclusive reform oriented forces were 
strong and well placed during the 2006 transition to push 
through those reforms.  This was the proximate factor leading 
to the inclusive reforms during the 2006 regime transition.13 
The third important link in identifying the underlying 
factor for the inclusive reforms is to trace how the forces 
seeking inclusion grew and became powerful enough to push 
them through.  Beyond the aspirations of the excluded groups 
to share power that almost always existed to varying degrees, 
what enabled them to become a force that could push the 
reforms through?  This question forces us to recognize the role 
of democracy in providing an enabling environment for the 
marginalized groups to organize and mobilize for their rights 
and become empowered.  The growth of ethnic organizations 
and mobilization became possible during the 1990-2002 
democratic years.  As mentioned earlier the mobilization of 
ethnic groups increased dramatically after 1990.  Numerous 
ethnic actors and organizations built cultural capital by 
reasserting their religions, their cultures, and by spreading 
the discourse of their rights during the democratic years. 
NEFIN and its constituent organizations were established 
and expanded during this period.  Likewise, the Madhesi 
Janadhikar Forum (Madhesi Peoples’ Rights Forum) that 
led the 2007 Madhesi movement also set up its organization 
during late nineties and early twenty-first century.14  The 
Maoist mobilization of the excluded groups also became 
feasible in mid and late nineties after the marginalized groups 
became aware of their inequalities and increasingly became 
alienated with the non-responsive polity.  
The Maoists, who played a major role in bringing about the 
transition and pushing for inclusive reforms, also benefitted 
from the democratic regime and its guarantee of political 
largest contributor to the regime change for democracy in 2006 that ushered 
in inclusive reforms as well.  The Maoists first precipitated a crisis for the 
establishment by spreading the insurgency rapidly, especially in the eyes of 
the monarchy and the Royal Nepal Army, and facilitated the dismissal of the 
elected government by the King in 2002.  This in turn helped to exacerbate 
the crisis further by polarizing different socio-political forces into two camps. 
13. One prominent indigenous activist told me that during the 
movement for the restoration of democracy, some of the second rung leaders 
of the movement, who set the programs and agendas for the struggle, 
belonged to the indigenous groups and they were instrumental in pushing 
through the declaration proclaiming the secularity of the state during the 
transition.  This was confirmed by indigenous politicians who operated 
as the second rung leadership during the movement.  This undermines 
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14. The MJF grew much larger after the success of the 2007 movement 
but its skeletal organization in most of the Tarai districts enabled it to launch 
and to provide leadership to the Madhesi movement.
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